Boeing reshuffles top engineers amid 737 MAX crisis

[Tug]

The more they get into this the more it’s looking to me that a major part of it is lack of training on the new systems those poor pilots should be provided with the training to instantly recognize the problem and the proper reaction to it not fighting the plane trying to look through the manual to figure it out as the case in the lion air crash 

[impulse]

7 hours ago, Ulic said:

Manufactures, pilots, airline maintenance and pilot training will all be put under the microscope and a clear picture will emerge as to exactly what happened, all in an effort to correct deficiencies and make the industry safer.

  

Then, the recommendations from the very clear NTSB report will be ignored or dragged out for as long as humanly possible, in order to make the industry more profitable.

 

[joecoolfrog]

If corners were found to be cut , corporate manslaughter charges should follow.

[quandow]

This isn't a real fix, this is similar to beating the dog cuz Mrs. Flannigan farted. I've personally worked with Boeing engineers, they only hire the best people.

[lannarebirth]

Seems appropriate but somewhat surprising nonetheless.

 

 

Quote

 

The FBI is reportedly joining the government's investigation into Boeing's 737 Max plane

 

https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-fbi-joins-investigation-into-plane-certification-report-2019-3

 

 

[GroveHillWanderer]

15 hours ago, Tug said:

The more they get into this the more it’s looking to me that a major part of it is lack of training on the new systems those poor pilots should be provided with the training to instantly recognize the problem and the proper reaction to it not fighting the plane trying to look through the manual to figure it out as the case in the lion air crash 

Quite - but the thing that rankles about the lack of training is that Boeing 'hid' the fact that there was this new system (MCAS) which is implicated in both these crashes - it wasn't even mentioned in the flight manuals. And as far as I can tell, the whole reason they did this was precisely so that they could claim to customers that pilots (who had already flown an older model 737) didn't need any training to fly the new version because its flight handling characteristics were pretty much identical to the older models. This then allowed them to claim (which they did) that airlines could save millions on pilot training, thus increasing the economic attractiveness of the 737 Max in order to boost sales.

 

Had they admitted that there was this new feature that could override the pilot's input, flagged it up and required the pilots to undergo new training on how to deal with it, that would have increased the overall cost to the airlines of operating the new model and most probably decreased sales.

[balo]

A day before the first crash in Indonesia, it happened again with the same aircraft. But a disaster was avoided because another pilot who was only visiting the cockpit knew what to do and how to disconnect MCAS to avoid a stall.

 

If this is true it's just shocking really. And sad. Why did they not report this to Boeing the same day? 

 

[billd766]

On 3/20/2019 at 3:58 PM, Humpy said:

One wonders why the need for a 'gizzmo' to right the aircraft at the stall and beyond.= and no means of overriding the system, that is if the system had an override ! Airliners have managed without this 'gizzmo' for many many years. Two highly trained and highly paid pilots up front can monitor speed and angle of climb and take steps to correct as necessary . Audible and 'control column  shake' warnings have been fitted to many aircraft for years in case the pilots were distracted. Keep it simple Boeing .

 

KISS works very well.

Keep

It

Simple

Stupid.

 

Keeping things simple have worked for many decades.

The more bells and whistles you hang on to aircraft the harder they are to fly and the harder they are to maintain.

[Basil B]

Quote

 

The pilots of a Boeing 737 MAX frantically scoured a manual before their plane crashed into the Java Sea in October, killing all 189 people on board.

Recordings from the cockpit of the Lion Air plane suggest that the pilots were struggling to understand why the jet was lurching downwards, but ran out of time before it hit the water.

Two minutes into the flight, the first officer reported a "flight control problem" to air traffic control and said that they intended to maintain an altitude of 5,000ft.

https://news.sky.com/story/boeing-737-max-pilots-scoured-manual-in-minutes-before-lion-air-crash-in-indonesia-11670763

 

 

 

[JohanB]

On 3/20/2019 at 9:58 AM, Humpy said:

One wonders why the need for a 'gizzmo' to right the aircraft at the stall and beyond.= and no means of overriding the system, that is if the system had an override ! Airliners have managed without this 'gizzmo' for many many years. Two highly trained and highly paid pilots up front can monitor speed and angle of climb and take steps to correct as necessary . Audible and 'control column  shake' warnings have been fitted to many aircraft for years in case the pilots were distracted. Keep it simple Boeing .

 

 

I think you don’t understand the underlaying problem. It’s not a gizmo thing added to a normal balanced a/c.

This 737 Max with it’s forward mounted bigger/heavier engines is very difficult or almost impossible to take out of a stall and will stall under to high Angel of Attack.

This is due to the center of gravity change at high AoA. The a/c stalls and gets very nose heavy and can’t easily recover.

 

At high altitude in thin air, the difference in speed between ’stall’ and ’overspeed’ is very small ( look up ’coffin corner’) and the a/c can stall very quickly at high speed. That’s probably why Boeing made this MCAS system to work in the background, without descibing it in the pilots manual.

 

Now these accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia was, what we know, probably caused by one faulty AoA sensor (stuck in high AoA-mode) at low altitude that triggered the MCAS and sent the a/c in a deadly high speed dive...that don’t can be stopped by the normal stick/yoke.

The other AoA sensor may be working normally and shows the pilot normal values on the screen.

 

The problem is that just one faulty AoA sensor, without redundancy can trig the MCAS down trim, alarm and stick shaker during normal take off flight, when the flaps were retracted.

 

The pilots had no idea what was happening and how to turn off the system was not learned or even described in the flight manual.

 

 

[sandrabbit]

56 minutes ago, JohanB said:

The a/c stalls and gets very nose heavy and can’t easily recover.

Isn't that the preferred way of stalling nose first and the aircraft gains forward speed?. Are you trying to say a tail first stall is better?

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

16 hours ago, lannarebirth said:

Seems appropriate but somewhat surprising nonetheless.

 

 

 

 

I believe what the U.S. Justice Department and now the FBI are looking into was whether there was any criminal conduct or illegality in the processes that led to the 737 Max being developed and marketed by Boeing, and approved as ready for flight by the FAA -- when apparently, the jet wasn't QUITE ready....

[jpinx]

1 hour ago, JohanB said:

 

I think you don’t understand the underlaying problem. It’s not a gizmo thing added to a normal balanced a/c.

This 737 Max with it’s forward mounted bigger/heavier engines is very difficult or almost impossible to take out of a stall and will stall under to high Angel of Attack.

This is due to the center of gravity change at high AoA. The a/c stalls and gets very nose heavy and can’t easily recover.

 

At high altitude in thin air, the difference in speed between ’stall’ and ’overspeed’ is very small ( look up ’coffin corner’) and the a/c can stall very quickly at high speed. That’s probably why Boeing made this MCAS system to work in the background, without descibing it in the pilots manual.

 

Now these accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia was, what we know, probably caused by one faulty AoA sensor (stuck in high AoA-mode) at low altitude that triggered the MCAS and sent the a/c in a deadly high speed dive...that don’t can be stopped by the normal stick/yoke.

The other AoA sensor may be working normally and shows the pilot normal values on the screen.

 

The problem is that just one faulty AoA sensor, without redundancy can trig the MCAS down trim, alarm and stick shaker during normal take off flight, when the flaps were retracted.

 

The pilots had no idea what was happening and how to turn off the system was not learned or even described in the flight manual.

 

 

Giving an automatic system authority over flight controls, based on the input of a single sensor is nothing short of criminal!

[ravip]

On 3/20/2019 at 8:45 AM, lannarebirth said:

The NTSB is the gold standard of investigative agencies. Their report will pull no punches and be both believed and acted upon by everyone.

Today it is very difficult to find gold standards

[jpinx]

14 minutes ago, sandrabbit said:

Isn't that the preferred way of stalling nose first and the aircraft gains forward speed?. Are you trying to say a tail first stall is better?

I think the reference is to the aircraft having a limited range of CofG which is further limited in the configuration/flight condition of a stall. Aircraft are usually designed to stall the main wing first. Stalling the tailplane is a "deep stall" and has different characteristics.  Stalling the tailplane before the mainwing is not something I've tried, but I'd expect a severe tail-down movement as the tailplane loses lift. You'd need to ask a Pitts jockey to try it for you. ????

 

Boeing, Airbus, et al are always pushing the boundaries of aerodynamics - sometimes with spectacularly impressive results, but the underlying rules of the science are the same and must be respected.

[Chomper Higgot]

16 minutes ago, jpinx said:

Giving an automatic system authority over flight controls, based on the input of a single sensor is nothing short of criminal!

It’ll be for the lawyers to fight that out, but the applicable functional safety standards are going to give the prosecution a great deal of ammunition in that fight.

 

Your point regarding a single sensor for such critical service is bang on. 

 

 

 

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

25 minutes ago, jpinx said:

Giving an automatic system authority over flight controls, based on the input of a single sensor is nothing short of criminal!

 

There's an interesting article from the NYT that just went live on how two of the features that might have prevented these kinds of crashes were sold as extra cost options on the 737 Max by Boeing instead of being included in the core plane design/product, and neither of the crashed airlines had paid extra for them, thus their planes didn't have them.

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-features-charge.html

 

Quote

 

Boeing’s optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another.
 

Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes, according to a person familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they have not been made public. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration.

 

 

 

[Prissana Pescud]

On 3/20/2019 at 10:15 AM, lannarebirth said:

The NTSB is the gold standard of investigative agencies. Their report will pull no punches and be both believed and acted upon by everyone.

Yes, they may investigate. So did they give a gold standard to the Malaysian Boeing airline crashes?

Still unresolved due to political pressure I believe.

 But the issue is about FAA. And why they allowed a computer programme to override the pilot without further testing.

And why they allowed the instructions to pilots but never ensured that the instructions were ever taught to overseas pilots.

The first crash allowed them and Boeing ample time to correct the issue. They did nothing. They will both be condemned and rightly so.

I have no doubt that Boeing will fix this issue. But why did they not fix it after the first crash.

And I am sure some massive legal bills and compensation will result.

Sell Boeing now, buy back after it plummets is my callous economic washing of the hands.

[SheungWan]

 

 

[stevemac]

Yes, was only a matter of time till that happened, followed by other countries don't trusting the FAA on this anymore. Hence the action from other countries before the USA, and hence "Europe and Canada said they would seek their own guarantees over the safety of Boeing's 737 MAX'.
It seems obvious the FAA can not be trusted on this anymore.

Yes it seems they (Boeing)were basically allowed to self certify parts of the process with too little oversight. Think there will be some back-peddling on this procedure.

Sent from my SM-G965F using Thailand Forum - Thaivisa mobile app

[stevemac]

One wonders why the need for a 'gizzmo' to right the aircraft at the stall and beyond.= and no means of overriding the system, that is if the system had an override ! Airliners have managed without this 'gizzmo' for many many years. Two highly trained and highly paid pilots up front can monitor speed and angle of climb and take steps to correct as necessary . Audible and 'control column  shake' warnings have been fitted to many aircraft for years in case the pilots were distracted. Keep it simple Boeing .
 

The difference with this model is the size and position of the larger engine tending to push the nose up (making the aircraft less stable?). This is why they needed additional system.
MAYBE this is a problem revamping an existing design, rather than starting from scratch.

Sent from my SM-G965F using Thailand Forum - Thaivisa mobile app

[mooping20Baht]

from counterpunch magazine,   denmark stinks of el duce

+ Is this really the best time for Trump to be nominating ex-Boeing executive Patrick Shanahan for Secretary of Defense?

+ Keeping his head firmly planted in the sand, Shanahan claims he hasn’t been briefed on the Boeing 737 Max 8 crashes.

+ The odious Chris Cuomo is busy trying to blame the Boeing crash on “foreign pilots.” (The pilot in question had 8,000 hours of experience.)

+ But according to a US government database, at least two pilots who flew Boeing 737 Max 8 planes on U.S. routes had filed reports about the plane’s nose suddenly dipping after engaging autopilot.

+ In a desperate bid to protect Boeing, the NTSB is actively working to coerce Ethiopian Air to turn the black box data recorders over to them, instead of crash experts in the UK.

+ With the wreckage of Ethiopian Air FL 302 still smoldering, this is the time to crack open Ralph Nader and Wesley Smith’s prescient book, Collision Course: the Truth About Airline Safety. It was published 24 years ago, but the book still reads like a thriller and the situation has only gotten scarier since then.

+ Nader’s great-niece, Samya Stumo, died in the Ethiopian Airlines crash. Ralph has warned for years against the increasing reliance on artificial intelligence in aviation. “In this case, this is a plane whose misguided software overpowered its own pilots,” Nader said.

+ The critical software update to the Boeing 737 Max series was delayed for over a month as a result of Trump’s impetuous decision to shutdown the federal government.

+ According to Public Citizen:

    -Boeing donated $1 million to Trump’s inauguration

    -The Boeing CEO visited Mar-a-Lago

    -Trump’s acting secretary of defense worked at Boeing for 30 years

    -Nikki Haley is about to join Boeing’s board

    -Trump has used Boeing products & sites as a backdrop for major announcements

 

[pegman]

On March 20, 2019 at 3:14 AM, Ulic said:

 

Agree 100%. The FAA is far too close to Boeing and business. Just bootlickers for Boeing. The NTSB is the investigative gold standard and pulls no punches. Manufactures, pilots, airline maintenance and pilot training will all be put under the microscope and a clear picture will emerge as to exactly what happened, all in an effort to correct deficiencies and make the industry safer.

You mean the NTSB whose board members get appointed by Trump, 555. I'll be sticking to Airbus while the Trump Regime is in place. This may be his "atta boy Brownie" moment.

[sandrabbit]

On 3/21/2019 at 10:19 PM, jpinx said:

I think the reference is to the aircraft having a limited range of CofG which is further limited in the configuration/flight condition of a stall. Aircraft are usually designed to stall the main wing first. Stalling the tailplane is a "deep stall" and has different characteristics.  Stalling the tailplane before the mainwing is not something I've tried, but I'd expect a severe tail-down movement as the tailplane loses lift. You'd need to ask a Pitts jockey to try it for you. ????

 

Boeing, Airbus, et al are always pushing the boundaries of aerodynamics - sometimes with spectacularly impressive results, but the underlying rules of the science are the same and must be respected.

great answer and I had never thought of that as the way you explained it, I was thinking at the time about the aircraft flying/going backwards into the ground because as I understand it it's almost impossible for an airliner to recover from a stall like that. I have seen many aerobatic videos of aircraft falling through smoke vertically with the nose straight up  and that's where I was coming from with my comment.

[impulse]

On 3/21/2019 at 10:19 AM, jpinx said:

Aircraft are usually designed to stall the main wing first. Stalling the tailplane is a "deep stall" and has different characteristics.  Stalling the tailplane before the mainwing is not something I've tried, but I'd expect a severe tail-down movement as the tailplane loses lift. You'd need to ask a Pitts jockey to try it for you. ????

 

Boeing, Airbus, et al are always pushing the boundaries of aerodynamics - sometimes with spectacularly impressive results, but the underlying rules of the science are the same and must be respected.

 

I'm wondering when they're going to eliminate the tailplane (and inherent parasitic drag) altogether, in favor of front end canards.  The biggest problem I see with a tailplane is that the lift it generates pulls the tail down, and has to be counteracted by more lift from the wing.  All of that creates drag. 

 

A front end canard lifts the front end, adding to overall lift and taking some load from the wing.  Seems like that's a way to get more km per ton of fuel.

 

But, I'm not an aerospace guy.  I'd be interested to hear from someone who is.

 

 

[jpinx]

On 3/27/2019 at 4:19 PM, impulse said:

 

I'm wondering when they're going to eliminate the tailplane (and inherent parasitic drag) altogether, in favor of front end canards.  The biggest problem I see with a tailplane is that the lift it generates pulls the tail down, and has to be counteracted by more lift from the wing.  All of that creates drag. 

 

A front end canard lifts the front end, adding to overall lift and taking some load from the wing.  Seems like that's a way to get more km per ton of fuel.

 

But, I'm not an aerospace guy.  I'd be interested to hear from someone who is.

 

 

Several fighter jets are "canard" configurations.   Search for Saab Viggen, and the currently in-service UK's Typhoon. It's front end control makes it enormously capable, much more than a tailplane could manage. Imagine something like the Typhoon scaled up to the double-decker airbus size -- it'd be a most impressive monster !

 

The conventional tailplane is used to alter the main wings angle of attack, which controls the lift generated.  The heavier the aircraft, the more lift is needed, so the angle of attack needs to be greater. The tailplane pushes the tail down to change the attitude and increase the angle of attack. It's counter intuitive, pushing down when you need more lift, and that is the dilemna. Look back at early pioneers, building and flying their own "string-kites" and you'll probably notice that there were a fair number of designs with the small wing at the front. The need for a small wing is simply because balancing the whole weight of the machine on one wing restricts the possible position of the centre of gravity. I reckon the little wing moved to the back to get it out of the pilot's field of view, and there it has stayed ever since -- a bit like first gear in manual car gearboxes is to the left and forwards --  unless you're French! ????

 

Aircraft companies have to keep costs down, and to totally re-think the most basic configuration would be to re-start the aerospace industry, and it's certification, and no-one has pockets that deep, but it's a very nice thought to play with .????

 

[impulse]

1 hour ago, jpinx said:

Aircraft companies have to keep costs down, and to totally re-think the most basic configuration would be to re-start the aerospace industry, and it's certification, and no-one has pockets that deep, but it's a very nice thought to play with .

 

I'm afraid that what's missing here is that, in order to keep commonality of parts while using the new engine, Boeing was required to create a fundamentally unstable aircraft that relies on a computer to keep it in the air.  That flies in the face of 70+ years of convention that commercial aircraft (as opposed to military aircraft) need to be inherently stable even if the power goes dead.

 

Even if they revamp the software, they still end up with an inherently unstable aircraft.  And I believe that's why they quietly tried to sneak the MCAS system in without adequate pilot training- to keep from revealing the plane violates a pretty sacred convention.  That it be inherently stable.

 

[jpinx]

On 3/30/2019 at 11:51 AM, impulse said:

 

I'm afraid that what's missing here is that, in order to keep commonality of parts while using the new engine, Boeing was required to create a fundamentally unstable aircraft that relies on a computer to keep it in the air.  That flies in the face of 70+ years of convention that commercial aircraft (as opposed to military aircraft) need to be inherently stable even if the power goes dead.

 

Even if they revamp the software, they still end up with an inherently unstable aircraft.  And I believe that's why they quietly tried to sneak the MCAS system in without adequate pilot training- to keep from revealing the plane violates a pretty sacred convention.  That it be inherently stable.

 

Grandfathering certification is the root cause.  If that was not allowed *every* aircraft would need it's own certification, whether it's a Mk I or Mk II , but that's a more fundamental change to certification than the industry could support.

[tomacht8]

737 Max fixed.