FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet's anti-stall system - JATR findings

[rooster59]

FAA failed to properly review 737 MAX jet's anti-stall system - JATR findings

By David Shepardson and Jamie Freed

 

FILE PHOTO: An aerial photo shows Boeing 737 MAX aircraft at Boeing facilities at the Grant County International Airport in Moses Lake, Washington, September 16, 2019. REUTERS/Lindsey Wasson/File Photo

 

WASHINGTON/SINGAPORE (Reuters) - A panel of international air safety regulators on Friday harshly criticized the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) review of a safety system on Boeing's <BA.N> 737 MAX airliner later tied to two crashes that killed all 346 people aboard.

 

The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) was commissioned by the FAA in April to look into the agency's oversight and approval of the so-called MCAS anti-stall system.

 

The report also faulted Boeing for assumptions it made in designing the airplane and found areas where Boeing could improve processes.

 

"The JATR team found that the MCAS was not evaluated as a complete and integrated function in the certification documents that were submitted to the FAA," the 69-page series of findings and recommendations said.

 

"The lack of a unified top-down development and evaluation of the system function and its safety analyses, combined with the extensive and fragmented documentation, made it difficult to assess whether compliance was fully demonstrated."

 

Boeing did not directly address the report's findings but said it "is committed to working with the FAA in reviewing the recommendations and helping to continuously improve the process and approach used to validate and certify airplanes."

 

Regulators around the world continue to scrutinize proposed software changes and training revisions from Boeing aimed at returning the Boeing 737 MAX to service.

 

Boeing's top-selling airplane has been grounded worldwide since a March 10 crash in Ethiopia killed 157 people, five months after a Lion Air 737 MAX crashed in Indonesia, killing 189 people on board.

 

Major U.S. airlines including Southwest Airlines Inc <LUV.N> and American Airlines Inc <AAL.O> currently do not expect 737 MAX flights to resume before January.

 

The JATR draft recommendations, obtained by Reuters ahead of their release on Friday, also said the FAA's longstanding practice of delegating "a high level" of certification tasks to manufacturers such as Boeing needs significant reform to ensure adequate safety oversight.

 

"With adequate FAA engagement and oversight, the extent of delegation does not in itself compromise safety," the report said.

 

"However, in the B737 MAX program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of the MCAS function which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in an inability of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of the Boeing-proposed certification activities associated with MCAS."

 

The report also questioned FAA's limited staffing to oversee certification tasks it designated to Boeing and said there were an "inadequate number of FAA specialists" involved in the certification of the 737 MAX.

 

There were signs that Boeing employees conducting FAA work faced "undue pressure. ..which may be attributed to conflicting priorities and an environment that does not support FAA requirements," it said.

 

FAA Administrator Steve Dickson said in a statement he would look at the panel's recommendations and take appropriate action following the "unvarnished and independent review of the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX."

 

MCAS UNDER SCRUTINY

 

The U.S. planemaker has stopped short of admitting any fault in how it developed the 737 MAX, or MCAS, which repeatedly pushed the plane's nose down in the Indonesian and Ethiopian crashes while the pilots struggled to intervene.

 

However, it has said erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) data fed to MCAS - the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System - was a common link in two wider chains of events leading to the crashes.

 

The JATR report recommended the FAA review the stalling characteristics of the 737 MAX without MCAS and associated systems to determine if unsafe characteristics exist and if so, if a broader review of the system design was needed.

 

JATR said MCAS and those systems could be considered a stall identification or stall protection system, depending on how the aircraft handled without them.

 

Boeing has said MCAS was not meant to prevent stalls and was instead designed so that the 737 MAX would have similar handling characteristics to its predecessor, the 737 NG.

 

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) last month said it planned to undertake flight tests of the 737 MAX including a test without MCAS to check its performance during high-speed turns and stall.

 

Boeing is revising the 737 MAX software to require the MCAS system to receive input from both AOA sensors, and has added additional safeguards. If the AOA sensors differ by 5.5 degrees or more then MCAS cannot operate, FAA Deputy Administrator Dan Elwell said last month.

 

If MCAS does operate it can only operate once unless the problem had been “completely resolved,” he added.

 

The JATR is headed by Christopher Hart, former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and includes air safety regulators from the United States, Canada, China, Indonesia, European Union, Brazil, Australia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates and Japan.

 

Last month, Hart said it was important to note "the U.S. aviation system each day transports millions of people safely, so it’s not like we have to completely overhaul the entire system, it’s not broken. But these incidents have shown us that there are ways to improve the existing system."

 

(Reporting by David Shepardson in Washington, additional reporting by Jamie Freed in Singapore; editing by Jane Wardell and Jason Neely)

 

-- © Copyright Reuters 2019-10-12

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[madmen]

Boeing build it FAA approves it...automatically but that cozy little relationship killed 300

[neeray]

4 minutes ago, madmen said:

Boeing build it FAA approves it...automatically but that cozy little relationship killed 300

Can you prove this statement or is this just your supposition?

[stevenl]

2 hours ago, neeray said:

Can you prove this statement or is this just your supposition?

Reading the article and the blame laid at both Boeing and FAA it seems very reasonable to come to the conclusion as by madmen.

[KhunBENQ]

2 hours ago, rooster59 said:

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) last month said it planned to undertake flight tests of the 737 MAX including a test without MCAS to check its performance during high-speed turns and stall.

EASA will be next hurdle. FAA lost so much of it's reputation that other agencies don't just approve by studying paperwork anymore.

Volunteers step forward for the test flights.

Mr. Muilenburg is graciously invited.

[pegman]

 

2 hours ago, neeray said:

Can you prove this statement or is this just your supposition?

Do you think the FAA provided proper oversight in certifying the 737-MAX? My experience with North American transportation regulators is that they and industry are usually in an incestuous relationship. Most positions at the regulator are filled by former industry management. They are all one big happy family. 

[metisdead]

A troll post has been removed, the off topic reply was removed as well. 

[Basil B]

3 hours ago, madmen said:

Boeing build it FAA approves it...automatically but that cozy little relationship killed 300

Nothing new...

 

UA flight 811 in 1989 springs to mind had it not been some numbskull leaving boxes of document lying around a court room that relatives of a victim picked up no doubt there would have many more 747 fatalities.

 

Their detective work found a cover by the FAA and NTSB of a Boeing design fault. 

Quote

Personal investigation and later developments[edit]

Lee Campbell, a New Zealander returning home, was one of the casualties on Flight 811. After his death, his parents Kevin and Susan Campbell investigated the cause using documents obtained from the NTSB.^[12] The Campbells' investigation led them to conclude that the cause of the accident was not human error but rather the combination of an electrical problem and an inadequate design of the aircraft's cargo door latching mechanism. They later presented their theory to the safety board.^[13]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_811

[Basil B]

Months ago Boeing said they had fixed the problem and the plane would be back in the air by the end of the month, I think tat was May.

 

Now with nearly 400 delivered and a further 300 odd parked up on the employees car park at Renton, now with another damming report will this plane ever fly again, at a unit cost of about $100mil each assuming Boeing has to buy them back that would be a $70Billion hit.

[trainman34014]

Saw a Documentary about this last month and it would seem Boeing have the majortiy of FAA Inspectors in their pockets.    Comeuppance time for these Guys and not a minute too soon.   Boeing will take Decaades to live this down and in the long run it could spell the beginning of the end.  Just look at the Airbus build and deliver figures for the last few months and you can see where the orders are now going.....to a proper regulated company.

[JusticeGB]

Sad that "independent" agencies in the States are just as lazy as in the Land of Smiles (the land of brown envelopes?).

[TPI]

23 hours ago, neeray said:

Can you prove this statement or is this just your supposition?

You obviously didn't read the article?

[mtls2005]

Until everyone, and I mean everyone (Boeing, government lobbysists, FAA) comes clean, accepts responsibility this plane will never fly.

 

 

JTAR Report -->  https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/Final_JATR_Submittal_to_FAA_Oct_2019.pdf

 

snip from exec summary...

 

1. Changed Product Rule
The FAA continually amends aircraft design regulations to improve safety. New aircraft designs
are required to meet the latest amendments to the regulations, but in some circumstances,
changes to previously approved designs can be certified under previous regulatory amendments.
The process for determining the applicable amendments is governed by Section 21.101 of Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), known as the Changed Product Rule.4 The design
regulations for the B737 MAX included a combination of the following:
• Regulatory amendments in effect when the B737 was originally certified in 1967.
• Regulatory amendments in effect when Boeing applied for certification of the B737
MAX project.
• Regulatory amendments in effect during the time between original certification in 1967
and application for certification of the B737 MAX.
• Certain regulatory amendments that became effective after Boeing’s application date that
the company elected to comply with.
5
• Special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent level of safety findings (typical of similar
certification projects).
• Additional design requirements and conditions (ADRCs). 

 

 

International regulator report slams Boeing, FAA over 737 MAX design and approval

 

The report from officials representing 10 different regulatory bodies carries the weight of the world’s aviation experts. Its findings point to glaring shortcomings in how Boeing’s 737 MAX was certified as safe, with the company effectively auditing its own design and and the FAA unable to fulfill its oversight role.

 

That’s a blow to Boeing’s reputation but also to the long-established primacy of the FAA among global aviation bodies. And the report raises serious questions as to how the regulatory system can be fixed to prevent similar accidents in the future.

 

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/international-regulator-report-slams-boeing-faa-over-737-max-design-and-approval/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=article_inset_1.1