PM shuns peace dialogue with separatist groups

[metisdead]

One more time:

Please use discretion in your references to the government. Phrases which can be considered as anti-coup will be removed. Referring to Thailand or the government as a dictatorship, military dictatorship or other such terms will be removed.

http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/topic/878797-updated-notice-to-members-posting-in-thailand-news/

[Siamthomas]

The PM may be remembered as one of most infamous leaders of Thailand

[DrTuner]

What's the point of having the muslims? Sell to Malaysia.

Well maybe it's because they are actually Thai, and have lived there longer than anyone from Thai Visa who has lived in Thailand?

Actually, no, not if you ask them - they are ethnic Malay - and that's the whole point of the insurgency.

The provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, as well as neighbouring parts of Songkhla Province, and the northeastern part of Malaysia (Kelantan), formed part of the Kingdom of Pattani, founded around the mid-13th century CE. In the 14th century CE, the Ayutthaya kingdom conquered the isthmus making the Kingdom of Pattani a self-governing vassal state, which owed allegiance to the king of Ayutthaya, but otherwise ran their own affairs. For centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas, ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgement of Siamese suzerainty, leaving the Pattani rulers largely alone.

With the fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese in 1569, Pattani became virtually independent, declaring complete independence after the Burmese, once again, captured and destroyed Ayutthaya in 1767. Pattani was again conquered by the Kingdom of Siam in 1785, and resumed its tributary status until 1909, when the Sultanate was divided between London and Bangkok under the the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909.

While the nation state of Thailand was created by Bangkoks colonisation of the north, north-east and south, the Pattani ruling class was never co-opted or assimilated into the Thai ruling elite (and the ethnic Malay population have never been respected or seen as fellow citizens). Even after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, the government in Bangkok interfered little locally, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local Islamic laws regarding issues on inheritance and family.

However, by 1934 Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion of a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Pattani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand. The National Culture Act was enforced as a result of the Thaification process, promoting the concept of "Thai-ness" and its centralist aims. Its "Mandate 3" was directly aimed at the Patani people. By 1944, Thai civil law was enforced throughout the land including the Patani region, over-riding earlier concessions to local Islamic administrative practices. The school curriculum was revised to be Thai-centric, with all lessons in the Thai language, to the detriment of the local Jawi. Traditional Muslim courts that formerly handled civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok.

This destruction and division of their Sultanate by the British, forced assimilation and perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society by the Thais, and being denied recognition as a culturally separate ethnic minority forced Pattani leaders to react against the Thai government policy towards them, leading to the insurgency as we know it today.

Good one. So, would Malaysia be interested in buying?

[jamesbrock]

What's the point of having the muslims? Sell to Malaysia.

Well maybe it's because they are actually Thai, and have lived there longer than anyone from Thai Visa who has lived in Thailand?

Actually, no, not if you ask them - they are ethnic Malay - and that's the whole point of the insurgency.

The provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, as well as neighbouring parts of Songkhla Province, and the northeastern part of Malaysia (Kelantan), formed part of the Kingdom of Pattani, founded around the mid-13th century CE. In the 14th century CE, the Ayutthaya kingdom conquered the isthmus making the Kingdom of Pattani a self-governing vassal state, which owed allegiance to the king of Ayutthaya, but otherwise ran their own affairs. For centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas, ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgement of Siamese suzerainty, leaving the Pattani rulers largely alone.

With the fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese in 1569, Pattani became virtually independent, declaring complete independence after the Burmese, once again, captured and destroyed Ayutthaya in 1767. Pattani was again conquered by the Kingdom of Siam in 1785, and resumed its tributary status until 1909, when the Sultanate was divided between London and Bangkok under the the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909.

While the nation state of Thailand was created by Bangkoks colonisation of the north, north-east and south, the Pattani ruling class was never co-opted or assimilated into the Thai ruling elite (and the ethnic Malay population have never been respected or seen as fellow citizens). Even after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, the government in Bangkok interfered little locally, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local Islamic laws regarding issues on inheritance and family.

However, by 1934 Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion of a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Pattani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand. The National Culture Act was enforced as a result of the Thaification process, promoting the concept of "Thai-ness" and its centralist aims. Its "Mandate 3" was directly aimed at the Patani people. By 1944, Thai civil law was enforced throughout the land including the Patani region, over-riding earlier concessions to local Islamic administrative practices. The school curriculum was revised to be Thai-centric, with all lessons in the Thai language, to the detriment of the local Jawi. Traditional Muslim courts that formerly handled civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok.

This destruction and division of their Sultanate by the British, forced assimilation and perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society by the Thais, and being denied recognition as a culturally separate ethnic minority forced Pattani leaders to react against the Thai government policy towards them, leading to the insurgency as we know it today.

Good one. So, would Malaysia be interested in buying?

[Edit: apologies for the long post; it is a complex situation that requires more than a simple paragraph to answer.]

The question is not so much as whether Malaysia would be willing to 'buy,' but whether the Thai ruling class would be prepared to lose face internationally by 'selling.'

I, too, have often thought, 'why not just let them have it?' It should not come as a surprise to many to know that the Thai ruling class who control the Thai state have a political, economic and social interest in maintaining the present borders and preventing any separatist movements from splitting off areas which are currently within these borders. States always exists in relation to other states in the world, with more powerful states dominating weaker states in an “imperialist” fashion. States also exist to control and rule over ordinary working people who make up the bulk of its citizens. As Lenin wrote in “State and Revolution”, the state is an instrument of class rule used to suppress other classes within society. Thus any sign of weakness, where a particular ruling class is seen to have to devolve power to others, or seen to lose control over certain areas, puts that ruling class at a disadvantage in relation to its international rivals and those who seek to challenge its rule from within.

The Thai state is certainly not a superpower, but it is jealous of its power over the population and resources within the present borders and it is also keen to act as a mini-imperialist with regard to weaker neighbouring states such as Lao and Cambodia. For this reason, the main obstacle to the self-determination for the people of Pattani, is the Thai state and its various constituents, especially the military. The Thai ruling class will not concede autonomy or independence for the people of Pattani without a struggle.

Even though the conflict is rooted in the history context described above, those historical grievances need to be re-fuelled for successive generations by continuing grievances and these grievances (explained below) have been, and are being, continually provided by the Thai state; and are the factors which explain why the people of Pattani have little faith in the Thai state today. It is necessary to point out that unlike the north and north-east, the old Pattani rulers and the entire Malay Muslim population of the area have been systematically excluded from mainstream Thai society, in terms of politics, culture and economic development. This explains the antagonism towards the Thai ruling class in Pattani. These factors are missing in north or north-east Thailand, which though colonised by Bangkok in the same period of capitalist nation building, are not involved in a similar civil war.

When considering the violence in Pattani, one should attempt to forget religious aspect that is being pushed by the mainstream as a main driving factor (especially the fallacy that the civil war is somehow instigated from abroad by “international Muslim extremists”) and find out what the local people are saying. Local Muslim people do not generally hate their Buddhist neighbours - the civil war never started as “communal violence” between people of differing religions, and this is still the case today. What local people are saying more than anything is that they want respect. Their religion, language and culture are not respected by the Thai state. The state education system emphasises Thai, Buddhist and Bangkok history and culture (considering Pattani's rich history and significant strategic importance in terms of international trade, this erasure of its history could explain why schools are often burnt). In the past 60 years successive Thai governments have arrested religious leaders, banned the teaching of yawee (the local dialect of Malay spoken in the area), closed religious schools, forced students to learn the Thai language, forced students to wear Thai-style clothes, encouraged people to change their names to “Thai” names and forcibly changed the names of local districts to “Thai-sounding” names. Up to the late 1990s most local people were not really demanding a separate state, although Thai government violence over the last 25 years—notably the Takbai and Krue-Sa massacres under the Thaksin government—may now have pushed most people towards supporting separation.

Pattani has also been severely neglected economically, and, even when there has been development, it has not been the majority of local Malay Muslims who have benefited. Approximately 160 billion baht is being spent by the Thai state in Pattani and, as a body of men, the military benefit from this more than anyone else (often in a corrupt manner). 70% of of the spending goes to counter-insurgency measures; the local economy of Pattani, at 120 billion baht, is worth less than this bloated military budget. Even so-called “development projects” in Pattani, such as road building, are given to military construction units. Few local jobs for local people are created and many people seek work in neighbouring Malaysia.

Most military commanders know deep down that they cannot beat the insurgents because they have local support and are able to carry out many operations freely. The only strategy that they have is to try to contain the violent situation so that it does not get any worse. These people can only talk about making Thai state “command structures” more efficient. Meanwhile, ordinary soldiers, many of whom are recruited or drafted from the poor villages of the north-east, have no will to fight. They care nothing about “the protection of the nation” and try just to survive their tour of duty. However, some more intelligent military commanders with field experience, like retired General Chawalit Yongjaiyut, have supported the idea of special political autonomy for Pattani. Chawalit gained experience from the conflict with the Communist Party of Thailand in the late 1970s and understands that a political solution, rather than a military solution. is necessary.

It would be safe to say, however, that no political solution can be achieved while Pattani is flooded by men with guns. Forty-five per cent of the Thai military is currently occupying Pattani and added to this are the thousands of villagers who have been armed by the Thai state in so-called “village protection squads”. Apart from the army, paramilitary rangers and police, there are 3300 members of the Volunteer Defence Corps, 47,000 Village Defence Volunteers and 24,000 Village Protection Volunteers. The Village Protection Volunteers are an exclusively Buddhist force, under the queen’s patronage.

Let me pause here to categorically state that I believe that armed struggle is not the solution. One can empathise with all those who are oppressed by the Thai state without supporting their actions. Political struggles by mass movements—whether or not they are involved in armed struggles, strikes or mass protests—can be successful in forcing ruling classes to concede changes in the structure and the shape of the state. But ultimately change will be conceded by political decisions taken by politicians in consultation with other members of the ruling class. If these politicians are subjected to democratic elections and are accountable to the population it can be easier to change their minds. The so-called “peace talks”, held between the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Thai authorities in early 2013, was headed and controlled by the military. The top Thai negotiator was Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, secretary-general of the National Security Council. Even then, General Prayuth rejected out of hand the BRN demand for self-rule, by stating that he would “never accept” any change to the unitary Thai state. Now that he is PM, it seems even less likely that any peace talks will bear fruit, as no political solution can be achieved while negotiations with the separatists are run by the military instead of elected politicians. The local population cannot possibly participate in political discussions about their future in this atmosphere of war, violence and fear.

In order to achieve a political solution and self-determination in Pattani, the power and influence of the military in all aspects of Thai politics and society needs to be drastically reduced. The military budget needs to be cut to the bone and military officers removed from the media and state enterprises. Those who ordered the shooting of civilians in Bangkok and in Pattani and those who staged coup d'états need to be brought to justice. Unsurprisingly, these are the exact same factors required to build democracy, freedom and social justice in the rest of Thailand.

It should be obvious that the struggle for self-determination in Pattani closely parallels the struggle for democracy and freedom in Thailand as a whole. For both to be achieved, the power and influence of the Thai military needs to be reduced and draconian laws which limit freedom of expression, such as the emergency law, the defamation laws, and the lèse majesté law, must be repealed.

Unless a new pro-democracy movement—which is independent from Pheu Thai and the military, is willing to reject conservative Thai nationalism, and re-write the Thai narrative—can arise, the path towards self-determination in Pattani and freedom and democracy for Thailand as a whole will be a long one.

[DrTuner]

Jamesbrock, thank you so much. I was fishing for info like that and got more than I bargained

I now see there's more to the game than face alone. Allow a separatist group their way and in no time you'll have a line at your door, beginning with Issara Isaan or whatever they'd call it. The parallels you drew strike a chord.

[Holy Cinema]

Great post jamesbrock

[mtls2005]

Jamesbrock, thank you so much. I was fishing for info like that and got more than I bargained

I now see there's more to the game than face alone. Allow a separatist group their way and in no time you'll have a line at your door, beginning with Issara Isaan or whatever they'd call it. The parallels you drew strike a chord.

The lengthy posts should probably give credit to Wikipedia and Giles Ji Ungpakorn?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patani_(region)

http://links.org.au/node/3558

http://georgetownstreet.blogspot.com/2010/02/pattani-kingdom.html

[DrTuner]

Jamesbrock, thank you so much. I was fishing for info like that and got more than I bargained

I now see there's more to the game than face alone. Allow a separatist group their way and in no time you'll have a line at your door, beginning with Issara Isaan or whatever they'd call it. The parallels you drew strike a chord.

The lengthy posts should probably give credit to Wikipedia and Giles Ji Ungpakorn?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patani_(region)

http://links.org.au/node/3558

http://georgetownstreet.blogspot.com/2010/02/pattani-kingdom.html

Thank you for these links as well. There's an eery pattern, to me it looks like the military guidance hasn't changed at all during the 84y old history of Thailand. All repetition of the same old, same old.

[Eric Loh]

Those links and historical perspective by Jamesbrock will not change the anti Thaksin brigade who insist that he started the separatist movement.

[Bluespunk]

Those links and historical perspective by Jamesbrock will not change the anti Thaksin brigade who insist that he started the separatist movement.

He has a share of the responsibility. His politicking destroyed a system put in place as part of a settlement after the last serious secessionist conflict.

[dominique355]

"I will bring Happiness, Democracy and Reconciliation to Thai people!"

We start to see what he ment.

[happy Joe]

[Edit: apologies for the long post; it is a complex situation that requires more than a simple paragraph to answer.]

The question is not so much as whether Malaysia would be willing to 'buy,' but whether the Thai ruling class would be prepared to lose face internationally by 'selling.'

I, too, have often thought, 'why not just let them have it?' It should not come as a surprise to many to know that the Thai ruling class who control the Thai state have a political, economic and social interest in maintaining the present borders and preventing any separatist movements from splitting off areas which are currently within these borders. States always exists in relation to other states in the world, with more powerful states dominating weaker states in an “imperialist” fashion. States also exist to control and rule over ordinary working people who make up the bulk of its citizens. As Lenin wrote in “State and Revolution”, the state is an instrument of class rule used to suppress other classes within society. Thus any sign of weakness, where a particular ruling class is seen to have to devolve power to others, or seen to lose control over certain areas, puts that ruling class at a disadvantage in relation to its international rivals and those who seek to challenge its rule from within.

The Thai state is certainly not a superpower, but it is jealous of its power over the population and resources within the present borders and it is also keen to act as a mini-imperialist with regard to weaker neighbouring states such as Lao and Cambodia. For this reason, the main obstacle to the self-determination for the people of Pattani, is the Thai state and its various constituents, especially the military. The Thai ruling class will not concede autonomy or independence for the people of Pattani without a struggle.

Even though the conflict is rooted in the history context described above, those historical grievances need to be re-fuelled for successive generations by continuing grievances and these grievances (explained below) have been, and are being, continually provided by the Thai state; and are the factors which explain why the people of Pattani have little faith in the Thai state today. It is necessary to point out that unlike the north and north-east, the old Pattani rulers and the entire Malay Muslim population of the area have been systematically excluded from mainstream Thai society, in terms of politics, culture and economic development. This explains the antagonism towards the Thai ruling class in Pattani. These factors are missing in north or north-east Thailand, which though colonised by Bangkok in the same period of capitalist nation building, are not involved in a similar civil war.

When considering the violence in Pattani, one should attempt to forget religious aspect that is being pushed by the mainstream as a main driving factor (especially the fallacy that the civil war is somehow instigated from abroad by “international Muslim extremists”) and find out what the local people are saying. Local Muslim people do not generally hate their Buddhist neighbours - the civil war never started as “communal violence” between people of differing religions, and this is still the case today. What local people are saying more than anything is that they want respect. Their religion, language and culture are not respected by the Thai state. The state education system emphasises Thai, Buddhist and Bangkok history and culture (considering Pattani's rich history and significant strategic importance in terms of international trade, this erasure of its history could explain why schools are often burnt). In the past 60 years successive Thai governments have arrested religious leaders, banned the teaching of yawee (the local dialect of Malay spoken in the area), closed religious schools, forced students to learn the Thai language, forced students to wear Thai-style clothes, encouraged people to change their names to “Thai” names and forcibly changed the names of local districts to “Thai-sounding” names. Up to the late 1990s most local people were not really demanding a separate state, although Thai government violence over the last 25 years—notably the Takbai and Krue-Sa massacres under the Thaksin government—may now have pushed most people towards supporting separation.

Pattani has also been severely neglected economically, and, even when there has been development, it has not been the majority of local Malay Muslims who have benefited. Approximately 160 billion baht is being spent by the Thai state in Pattani and, as a body of men, the military benefit from this more than anyone else (often in a corrupt manner). 70% of of the spending goes to counter-insurgency measures; the local economy of Pattani, at 120 billion baht, is worth less than this bloated military budget. Even so-called “development projects” in Pattani, such as road building, are given to military construction units. Few local jobs for local people are created and many people seek work in neighbouring Malaysia.

Most military commanders know deep down that they cannot beat the insurgents because they have local support and are able to carry out many operations freely. The only strategy that they have is to try to contain the violent situation so that it does not get any worse. These people can only talk about making Thai state “command structures” more efficient. Meanwhile, ordinary soldiers, many of whom are recruited or drafted from the poor villages of the north-east, have no will to fight. They care nothing about “the protection of the nation” and try just to survive their tour of duty. However, some more intelligent military commanders with field experience, like retired General Chawalit Yongjaiyut, have supported the idea of special political autonomy for Pattani. Chawalit gained experience from the conflict with the Communist Party of Thailand in the late 1970s and understands that a political solution, rather than a military solution. is necessary.

It would be safe to say, however, that no political solution can be achieved while Pattani is flooded by men with guns. Forty-five per cent of the Thai military is currently occupying Pattani and added to this are the thousands of villagers who have been armed by the Thai state in so-called “village protection squads”. Apart from the army, paramilitary rangers and police, there are 3300 members of the Volunteer Defence Corps, 47,000 Village Defence Volunteers and 24,000 Village Protection Volunteers. The Village Protection Volunteers are an exclusively Buddhist force, under the queen’s patronage.

Let me pause here to categorically state that I believe that armed struggle is not the solution. One can empathise with all those who are oppressed by the Thai state without supporting their actions. Political struggles by mass movements—whether or not they are involved in armed struggles, strikes or mass protests—can be successful in forcing ruling classes to concede changes in the structure and the shape of the state. But ultimately change will be conceded by political decisions taken by politicians in consultation with other members of the ruling class. If these politicians are subjected to democratic elections and are accountable to the population it can be easier to change their minds. The so-called “peace talks”, held between the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Thai authorities in early 2013, was headed and controlled by the military. The top Thai negotiator was Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, secretary-general of the National Security Council. Even then, General Prayuth rejected out of hand the BRN demand for self-rule, by stating that he would “never accept” any change to the unitary Thai state. Now that he is PM, it seems even less likely that any peace talks will bear fruit, as no political solution can be achieved while negotiations with the separatists are run by the military instead of elected politicians. The local population cannot possibly participate in political discussions about their future in this atmosphere of war, violence and fear.

In order to achieve a political solution and self-determination in Pattani, the power and influence of the military in all aspects of Thai politics and society needs to be drastically reduced. The military budget needs to be cut to the bone and military officers removed from the media and state enterprises. Those who ordered the shooting of civilians in Bangkok and in Pattani and those who staged coup d'états need to be brought to justice. Unsurprisingly, these are the exact same factors required to build democracy, freedom and social justice in the rest of Thailand.

It should be obvious that the struggle for self-determination in Pattani closely parallels the struggle for democracy and freedom in Thailand as a whole. For both to be achieved, the power and influence of the Thai military needs to be reduced and draconian laws which limit freedom of expression, such as the emergency law, the defamation laws, and the lèse majesté law, must be repealed.

Unless a new pro-democracy movement—which is independent from Pheu Thai and the military, is willing to reject conservative Thai nationalism, and re-write the Thai narrative—can arise, the path towards self-determination in Pattani and freedom and democracy for Thailand as a whole will be a long one.

In short a diplomatic solution would be better but unthinkable in this case.

And your presentation too long (much too long ...) and biased does not take account of people in this area that would irreparably comdamnés to Islam with partition.

[Eric Loh]

Those links and historical perspective by Jamesbrock will not change the anti Thaksin brigade who insist that he started the separatist movement.

He has a share of the responsibility. His politicking destroyed a system put in place as part of a settlement after the last serious secessionist conflict.

There really not much politics in the south conflict. Errors were mainly in Thaksin's policies. The emergency law was too harsh and created more resentment. Then his support of the army in the Tak Bai massacre angered even the moderate Muslim.

To be fair, successive governments didn't do all that well in their policies too as insurgency casualties escalate even further. The Surayud government tried the reconciliation and tried his win their hearts and mind campaign and was also a flop.

Ahbisit was confident his could stop the conflict in his term but failed too. Yingluck started her negotiation process and the conflict continued. Prayuth is not on board with the negotiation policy and left to be seen just what is his policy. Maybe his policy is to leave to the next government just like the RTP reform.

[Enoon]

Jamesbrock, thank you so much. I was fishing for info like that and got more than I bargained

I now see there's more to the game than face alone. Allow a separatist group their way and in no time you'll have a line at your door, beginning with Issara Isaan or whatever they'd call it. The parallels you drew strike a chord.

Because that's what happens when Colonialist (in this case Internal Colonialist) empires collapse.

Not a question of "if" but "when" and "how".

[Enoon]

[Edit: apologies for the long post; it is a complex situation that requires more than a simple paragraph to answer.]

The question is not so much as whether Malaysia would be willing to 'buy,' but whether the Thai ruling class would be prepared to lose face internationally by 'selling.'

I, too, have often thought, 'why not just let them have it?' It should not come as a surprise to many to know that the Thai ruling class who control the Thai state have a political, economic and social interest in maintaining the present borders and preventing any separatist movements from splitting off areas which are currently within these borders. States always exists in relation to other states in the world, with more powerful states dominating weaker states in an “imperialist” fashion. States also exist to control and rule over ordinary working people who make up the bulk of its citizens. As Lenin wrote in “State and Revolution”, the state is an instrument of class rule used to suppress other classes within society. Thus any sign of weakness, where a particular ruling class is seen to have to devolve power to others, or seen to lose control over certain areas, puts that ruling class at a disadvantage in relation to its international rivals and those who seek to challenge its rule from within.

The Thai state is certainly not a superpower, but it is jealous of its power over the population and resources within the present borders and it is also keen to act as a mini-imperialist with regard to weaker neighbouring states such as Lao and Cambodia. For this reason, the main obstacle to the self-determination for the people of Pattani, is the Thai state and its various constituents, especially the military. The Thai ruling class will not concede autonomy or independence for the people of Pattani without a struggle.

Even though the conflict is rooted in the history context described above, those historical grievances need to be re-fuelled for successive generations by continuing grievances and these grievances (explained below) have been, and are being, continually provided by the Thai state; and are the factors which explain why the people of Pattani have little faith in the Thai state today. It is necessary to point out that unlike the north and north-east, the old Pattani rulers and the entire Malay Muslim population of the area have been systematically excluded from mainstream Thai society, in terms of politics, culture and economic development. This explains the antagonism towards the Thai ruling class in Pattani. These factors are missing in north or north-east Thailand, which though colonised by Bangkok in the same period of capitalist nation building, are not involved in a similar civil war.

When considering the violence in Pattani, one should attempt to forget religious aspect that is being pushed by the mainstream as a main driving factor (especially the fallacy that the civil war is somehow instigated from abroad by “international Muslim extremists”) and find out what the local people are saying. Local Muslim people do not generally hate their Buddhist neighbours - the civil war never started as “communal violence” between people of differing religions, and this is still the case today. What local people are saying more than anything is that they want respect. Their religion, language and culture are not respected by the Thai state. The state education system emphasises Thai, Buddhist and Bangkok history and culture (considering Pattani's rich history and significant strategic importance in terms of international trade, this erasure of its history could explain why schools are often burnt). In the past 60 years successive Thai governments have arrested religious leaders, banned the teaching of yawee (the local dialect of Malay spoken in the area), closed religious schools, forced students to learn the Thai language, forced students to wear Thai-style clothes, encouraged people to change their names to “Thai” names and forcibly changed the names of local districts to “Thai-sounding” names. Up to the late 1990s most local people were not really demanding a separate state, although Thai government violence over the last 25 years—notably the Takbai and Krue-Sa massacres under the Thaksin government—may now have pushed most people towards supporting separation.

Pattani has also been severely neglected economically, and, even when there has been development, it has not been the majority of local Malay Muslims who have benefited. Approximately 160 billion baht is being spent by the Thai state in Pattani and, as a body of men, the military benefit from this more than anyone else (often in a corrupt manner). 70% of of the spending goes to counter-insurgency measures; the local economy of Pattani, at 120 billion baht, is worth less than this bloated military budget. Even so-called “development projects” in Pattani, such as road building, are given to military construction units. Few local jobs for local people are created and many people seek work in neighbouring Malaysia.

Most military commanders know deep down that they cannot beat the insurgents because they have local support and are able to carry out many operations freely. The only strategy that they have is to try to contain the violent situation so that it does not get any worse. These people can only talk about making Thai state “command structures” more efficient. Meanwhile, ordinary soldiers, many of whom are recruited or drafted from the poor villages of the north-east, have no will to fight. They care nothing about “the protection of the nation” and try just to survive their tour of duty. However, some more intelligent military commanders with field experience, like retired General Chawalit Yongjaiyut, have supported the idea of special political autonomy for Pattani. Chawalit gained experience from the conflict with the Communist Party of Thailand in the late 1970s and understands that a political solution, rather than a military solution. is necessary.

It would be safe to say, however, that no political solution can be achieved while Pattani is flooded by men with guns. Forty-five per cent of the Thai military is currently occupying Pattani and added to this are the thousands of villagers who have been armed by the Thai state in so-called “village protection squads”. Apart from the army, paramilitary rangers and police, there are 3300 members of the Volunteer Defence Corps, 47,000 Village Defence Volunteers and 24,000 Village Protection Volunteers. The Village Protection Volunteers are an exclusively Buddhist force, under the queen’s patronage.

Let me pause here to categorically state that I believe that armed struggle is not the solution. One can empathise with all those who are oppressed by the Thai state without supporting their actions. Political struggles by mass movements—whether or not they are involved in armed struggles, strikes or mass protests—can be successful in forcing ruling classes to concede changes in the structure and the shape of the state. But ultimately change will be conceded by political decisions taken by politicians in consultation with other members of the ruling class. If these politicians are subjected to democratic elections and are accountable to the population it can be easier to change their minds. The so-called “peace talks”, held between the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Thai authorities in early 2013, was headed and controlled by the military. The top Thai negotiator was Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, secretary-general of the National Security Council. Even then, General Prayuth rejected out of hand the BRN demand for self-rule, by stating that he would “never accept” any change to the unitary Thai state. Now that he is PM, it seems even less likely that any peace talks will bear fruit, as no political solution can be achieved while negotiations with the separatists are run by the military instead of elected politicians. The local population cannot possibly participate in political discussions about their future in this atmosphere of war, violence and fear.

In order to achieve a political solution and self-determination in Pattani, the power and influence of the military in all aspects of Thai politics and society needs to be drastically reduced. The military budget needs to be cut to the bone and military officers removed from the media and state enterprises. Those who ordered the shooting of civilians in Bangkok and in Pattani and those who staged coup d'états need to be brought to justice. Unsurprisingly, these are the exact same factors required to build democracy, freedom and social justice in the rest of Thailand.

It should be obvious that the struggle for self-determination in Pattani closely parallels the struggle for democracy and freedom in Thailand as a whole. For both to be achieved, the power and influence of the Thai military needs to be reduced and draconian laws which limit freedom of expression, such as the emergency law, the defamation laws, and the lèse majesté law, must be repealed.

Unless a new pro-democracy movement—which is independent from Pheu Thai and the military, is willing to reject conservative Thai nationalism, and re-write the Thai narrative—can arise, the path towards self-determination in Pattani and freedom and democracy for Thailand as a whole will be a long one.

In short a diplomatic solution would be better but unthinkable in this case.

And your presentation too long (much too long ...) and biased does not take account of people in this area that would irreparably comdamnés to Islam with partition.

Who are in a minority and would have to conform or leave, hopefully without the atrocities committed when British India was partitioned into India/West and East Pakistan.

That's what happens: omelettes/eggs, etc.

[Enoon]

What's the point of having the muslims? Sell to Malaysia.

Well maybe it's because they are actually Thai, and have lived there longer than anyone from Thai Visa who has lived in Thailand?

Actually, no, not if you ask them - they are ethnic Malay - and that's the whole point of the insurgency.

The provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, as well as neighbouring parts of Songkhla Province, and the northeastern part of Malaysia (Kelantan), formed part of the Kingdom of Pattani, founded around the mid-13th century CE. In the 14th century CE, the Ayutthaya kingdom conquered the isthmus making the Kingdom of Pattani a self-governing vassal state, which owed allegiance to the king of Ayutthaya, but otherwise ran their own affairs. For centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas, ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgement of Siamese suzerainty, leaving the Pattani rulers largely alone.

With the fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese in 1569, Pattani became virtually independent, declaring complete independence after the Burmese, once again, captured and destroyed Ayutthaya in 1767. Pattani was again conquered by the Kingdom of Siam in 1785, and resumed its tributary status until 1909, when the Sultanate was divided between London and Bangkok under the the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909.

While the nation state of Thailand was created by Bangkok’s colonisation of the north, north-east and south, the Pattani ruling class was never co-opted or assimilated into the Thai ruling elite (and the ethnic Malay population have never been respected or seen as fellow citizens). Even after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, the government in Bangkok interfered little locally, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local Islamic laws regarding issues on inheritance and family.

However, by 1934 Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion of a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Pattani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand. The National Culture Act was enforced as a result of the Thaification process, promoting the concept of "Thai-ness" and its centralist aims. Its "Mandate 3" was directly aimed at the Patani people. By 1944, Thai civil law was enforced throughout the land including the Patani region, over-riding earlier concessions to local Islamic administrative practices. The school curriculum was revised to be Thai-centric, with all lessons in the Thai language, to the detriment of the local Jawi. Traditional Muslim courts that formerly handled civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok.

This destruction and division of their Sultanate by the British, forced assimilation and perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society by the Thais, and being denied recognition as a culturally separate ethnic minority forced Pattani leaders to react against the Thai government policy towards them, leading to the insurgency as we know it today.

It's all out there for any thinking person to discover and understand.

Unfortunately, as we know:

"You can take a horse to water, but you can't make it drink.

You can take a man to knowledge, but you can't make him think."

[Enoon]

Many Imperialists/Colonialists have trodden the same bloody path, with the inevitable result.

The teflon is wearing thin now.

[Bluespunk]

Those links and historical perspective by Jamesbrock will not change the anti Thaksin brigade who insist that he started the separatist movement.

He has a share of the responsibility. His politicking destroyed a system put in place as part of a settlement after the last serious secessionist conflict.

There really not much politics in the south conflict. Errors were mainly in Thaksin's policies. The emergency law was too harsh and created more resentment. Then his support of the army in the Tak Bai massacre angered even the moderate Muslim.

To be fair, successive governments didn't do all that well in their policies too as insurgency casualties escalate even further. The Surayud government tried the reconciliation and tried his win their hearts and mind campaign and was also a flop.

Ahbisit was confident his could stop the conflict in his term but failed too. Yingluck started her negotiation process and the conflict continued. Prayuth is not on board with the negotiation policy and left to be seen just what is his policy. Maybe his policy is to leave to the next government just like the RTP reform.

Don't disagree with any of that. However thaksin does have his share of blame particularly regarding the disintegration of the system put in place after the last major outbreak of violence.

The fact is that negotiation is the only way forward. Violence has failed and will continue to do so, it is not the solution. Egos need to be left at the door, both sides need to make concessions and a lasting agreement must be found.

The alternative is more violence. That cannot be allowed to happen.

[NanLaew]

Jamesbrock, thank you so much. I was fishing for info like that and got more than I bargained

I now see there's more to the game than face alone. Allow a separatist group their way and in no time you'll have a line at your door, beginning with Issara Isaan or whatever they'd call it. The parallels you drew strike a chord.

The lengthy posts should probably give credit to Wikipedia and Giles Ji Ungpakorn?

And isn't he also on the junta's most wanted list? He's fled from LM charges in 2009 so be careful with any quotes from his written works. But do read them.

[Eric Loh]

Those links and historical perspective by Jamesbrock will not change the anti Thaksin brigade who insist that he started the separatist movement.

He has a share of the responsibility. His politicking destroyed a system put in place as part of a settlement after the last serious secessionist conflict.

There really not much politics in the south conflict. Errors were mainly in Thaksin's policies. The emergency law was too harsh and created more resentment. Then his support of the army in the Tak Bai massacre angered even the moderate Muslim.

To be fair, successive governments didn't do all that well in their policies too as insurgency casualties escalate even further. The Surayud government tried the reconciliation and tried his win their hearts and mind campaign and was also a flop.

Ahbisit was confident his could stop the conflict in his term but failed too. Yingluck started her negotiation process and the conflict continued. Prayuth is not on board with the negotiation policy and left to be seen just what is his policy. Maybe his policy is to leave to the next government just like the RTP reform.

Don't disagree with any of that. However thaksin does have his share of blame particularly regarding the disintegration of the system put in place after the last major outbreak of violence.

The fact is that negotiation is the only way forward. Violence has failed and will continue to do so, it is not the solution. Egos need to be left at the door, both sides need to make concessions and a lasting agreement must be found.

The alternative is more violence. That cannot be allowed to happen.

No doubt negotiation is the best way forward as we are in a stalemate and mounting civilian casualties. Perhaps the military should not be the main negotiator. They in fact can be the problem. For negotiation to succeed, we have to break the mental barrier. Openness and sincerity of civilians may be better than the self-centredness and egoism of the military chiefs.

[NanLaew]

One may not be a supporter of the junta but appreciate during military firmness appropriate in these circumstances.

Claims of South Muslims are limitless. Accept to cede a finger today would give up arm tomorrow. And he rest of the body after, huh.

Besides Muslims are not mistaken when they hold power over a piece of land. they never cede a small ounce.

Yes, you can see how far not negotiating and increased militarization got successive British governments over Ulster.

Get educated. Pattani isn't Thailand just as much as it isn't Malaysia. They don't want any more than what was taken away from them by warring overlords, mismanaged western colonialism and blind, military inspired nationalism.

Too funny. I recall a few years back when Cambodia used international law to legally re-claim a sliver of Thailand on the Cambodian border. I don't recall any Muslim's being front and center of that politically motivated but ultimately embarrassing Thai face loss.